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In the wake of Charlottesville, the rise of the alt-right, and
campus controversies, the First Amendment has fallen into pub-
lic scrutiny.  Historically, the First Amendment’s “marketplace of
ideas” has been a driving source of American political identity;
since Brandenburg v. Ohio, the First Amendment protects all
speech from government interference unless it causes incitement.
The marketplace of ideas allows for the good and the bad ideas
to enter American society and ultimately allows the people to
decide their own course.
Yet, is the First Amendment truly a tool of social progress?
Initially, the First Amendment curtailed war-time dissidents and
unpopular political movements.  Since Brandenburg, the Court’s
jurisprudence has turned towards free-speech absolutism.  Today,
free-speech discourse focuses on the right of what is said without
discussing what the effect of that discourse is.  Rather than al-
lowing the “market” to decide what is and is not acceptable
within public discourse, the Supreme Court has made the First
Amendment a truism.  The result is a fetishization of free speech
without understanding its broader implications.
This Comment argues that the Court’s jurisprudence consist-
ently reflects sociopolitical values of the dominant political ideol-
ogy.  This Comment begins by examining the history of the First
Amendment in the context of World War I and the development
of the “clear and present danger” doctrine, which was used to
suppress anti-war dissidents.  This doctrine evolved into the
Brandenburg incitement test, which embodied free-speech abso-
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University’s Dickinson Law, 2019.  This
project has been an undertaking of wrestling with difficult issues and one’s own
perspectives.  I would like to acknowledge the conversations with Lisa Portmess,
Vernon Cisney, Gary Mullen, Martin Skladany, Carla Pratt, and Clifford Kelly.
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lutism.  Following this legal analysis, this Comment credits the
philosophy of John Stuart Mill with laying the philosophical justi-
fication for the Court’s jurisprudence.  This Comment critiques
free-speech absolutism and its values, specifically tolerance and
the “marketplace of ideas,” by considering the power dynamics
at play during speech acts, specifically hate speech.  This critique
concludes by offering several possible solutions, including tort
remedies, to solve the power imbalance created by the Court’s
jurisprudence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the name of freedom of speech, the University of Chicago
invited Steve Bannon, former chief strategist and advisor to the
Trump administration, to debate his political philosophy.1  Con-
versely, a controversial Drexel professor, George Ciccariello-
Maher, resigned after a year of death threats because he publicly
criticized masculinity and white-ness.2  Two speakers, and yet one’s
1. University Statement on Planned Debate, UCHICAGONEWS (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2GANB4a [https://perma.cc/3PFE-UBVD].
2. Marwa Eltagouri, Professor Who Tweeted, ‘All I Want for Christmas Is
White Genocide,’ Resigns After Year of Threats, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2017),
https://wapo.st/2EHbRjq [https://perma.cc/DZB2-2TMV].  For a discussion on
white genocide, which is a sociological term discussing the belief that “white” Eu-
ropean culture is being destroyed by immigration and fertility trends, see Kathy
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free-speech rights were vindicated as part of academic freedom,
while the other’s very life and livelihood was put at risk despite his
“freedom of speech.”
Despite the First Amendment’s prohibition on the “abridg-
ment of speech,” some speech receives social censorship when it
critiques societal norms, while other speech, if potentially censored
on hate-speech grounds, receives passionate defenses.3  Recent
events have forced a reconsideration of the First Amendment’s
power, limitations, and value to society—namely, the rise of the alt-
right,4 protests,5 Charlottesville,6 and the Myanmar Genocide.7
One may question whether the First Amendment, in an increasingly
diverse society with multiple group identities that have historically
lacked power, is compatible with other Constitutional guarantees
and norms.8  If these values are incompatible, how do we save the
intellectual history worth saving?  While not without exception,9
Gilsinan, Why Is Dylann Roof So Worried About Europe?, ATLANTIC (June 24,
2015), https://bit.ly/2PRAA5F [https://perma.cc/HT9H-PWET].
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Jelani Cobb, The Mistake the Berkley
Protesters Made About Milo Yiannopoulos, NEW YORKER (Feb. 15, 2017), https://
bit.ly/2H6hpAT [https://perma.cc/GA5K-RHLT] (discussing the dilemma between
balancing the rights of vulnerable people versus the rights of aggressive speakers).
4. Paul P. Murphy, White Nationalists Use Tiki Torches to Light Up Char-
lottesville March, CNN (Aug. 14, 2017), https://cnn.it/2LrZKr3 [https://perma.cc/
8UTV-CZZQ] (detailing the “Unite the Right” march).
5. Natalie Shutler & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Free Speech-Hate Speech
Trade-Off, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2x1gsb0 [https://perma.cc/
EC5Z-AYWE] (discussing the difficulties of balancing constitutional guarantees
and individual autonomy).
6. See Associated Press, Officials: White Nationalist Rally Linked to 3 Deaths,
POLITICO (Aug. 12, 2017), https://politi.co/2H4fCwg [https://perma.cc/LW6P-YLLJ]
(detailing the effects of the “Unite the Right” rally); Linda Qiu, Trump Asks,
‘What About the Alt-Left?’ Here’s an Answer, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://
nyti.ms/2vItQyD [https://perma.cc/NWN4-F7N3] (detailing how the President’s
claim that both counter-protesters and protestors are to blame for Charlottesville
ignores the factual and ideological differences between both sides).
7. See Paul Mozur, A Genocide Incited on Facebook, with Posts from My-
anmar’s Military, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018); see also Roland Hughes, Myanmar
Rohingya: How a ‘Genocide’ Was Investigated, BBC NEWS (Sept. 3, 2018), https://
bbc.in/2PyUXVB [https://perma.cc/9Q7T-2WH9].  A military official perhaps
surmised the dehumanization best:  “[H]e ‘couldn’t accept the term Rhingya,
which does not exists in Myanmar.’”  Foster Klug, Rohingya Say Myanmar
Targeted the Educated in Genocide, AP NEWS (June 5, 2018), https://bit.ly/
2EFUU95 [https://perma.cc/8M7G-YBHZ].
8. See Judith Butler, Limits on Free Speech?, ACADEME BLOG (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2AdbfvW [https://perma.cc/6VB5-4AFP] (commenting on the tension
between diversity and the dignity of all individuals and allowing speech, under the
First Amendment’s justification, to dehumanize and harass minority groups and
individuals).
9. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36–37 (1973) (holding that obscenity
regulations could be constitutional); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448
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American jurisprudence believes that freedom of speech is vital to
our American sociopolitical system.10  Yet, what values does free
speech extol?
This Comment argues that one of the First Amendment’s phil-
osophical justifications—tolerance—creates contradictory values;
rather than allow for the free exchange of ideas, the First Amend-
ment entrenches and legitimizes ideas that deny others their hu-
manity, rendering any criticism “one idea of many.”11  While
proponents of free speech justify its unregulated nature  because it
respects individual autonomy and opinion, increases our access to
ideas, protects dissent, and respects citizens’ rights to self-govern-
ance,12 such a position is, at best, incomplete and, at worst, harmful.
Rather than fostering the exchanging of ideas, apolitical tolerance
becomes a means of entrenching ideas used to delegitimize minor-
ity groups’ very autonomy, because all perspectives possess
equivalent truth value.13  Thus, tolerance becomes a tool to prevent
any change within society and preserves legal, social, and political
structures currently in place.14
The position of this Comment traces major developments in
First Amendment interpretation.  Part II first discusses the Court’s
development of the “clear and present danger” test, which sanc-
(1969) (holding the state may not regulate speech which is not likely to cause im-
minent, lawless action); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
(articulating the “fighting words” doctrine, under which words that cause direct
disruptions of the peace can be regulated); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919) (holding that political speech could be restricted when it presented a
“clear and present danger”).
10. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“Discussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by our Constitution.”).  The Court further
noted, “The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political ex-
pression in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.’” Id. (quoting Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
11. See Jonathan Schonsheck, The “Market Place of Ideas:” A Siren Song for
Freedom of Speech Theorists, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN A DIVERSE WORLD
27, 34–35 (Deirdre Golash ed., 2010) (questioning the validity of the metaphor,
finding ideas are not exchanged but rather maintained and expressed).
12. See MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMEND-
MENT THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 1–17 (2001) (de-
tailing classical assumptions of the First Amendment).
13. Jelani Cobb, The Mistake the Berkley Protesters Made About Milo Yian-
nopoulos, NEW YORKER (Feb. 15, 2017), https://bit.ly/2H6hpAT [https://perma.cc/
CW6T-BZAW].
14. See infra Part III; see also BUNKER, supra note 12, at 14–15 (detailing the
necessity of protecting dissent and the difficulties with couching freedom of speech
in tolerance alone).
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tioned governmental suppression of free speech.15  Part II then dis-
cusses the Court’s movement away from support of government
suppression of dissident speech to a speaker friendly “incitement”
standard.16  Finally, Part II turns to the philosophical underpinnings
of Anglo-American thought which justify freedom of speech.17
Part III critiques freedom of speech by discussing the values which
justify freedom of speech.18  Ultimately, this Comment argues that
one of free speech’s justifications—tolerance for other perspec-
tives—may be contradictory to societal development and the asser-
tion of minority identities.  It proposes several solutions to this
problem:  (1) censorship of ideas that extol supremacy over histori-
cally marginalized groups; (2) development of a more responsive
“incitement” standard that benefits historically marginalized
groups; (3) democratic deliberation embedded in principles such as
the Fairness Doctrine; and (4) private tort action.19  Ultimately, this
Comment uses a philosophy and law perspective to answer the
question:  does an unregulated marketplace of ideas cost society?20
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Court’s War-Time Speech Jurisprudence and the Clear
and Present Danger Test
In Schenck v. United States,21 the Court upheld Charles
Schenck’s conviction under the Espionage Act.22  The Espionage
Act, specifically its prohibition of government criticism, criminal-
ized speech that disrupted military duties or obstructed military re-
cruitment, whether or not such advocacy impaired recruitment.23
Schenck was convicted under the Espionage Act for circulating a
pamphlet that dissuaded servicemembers from serving during
15. See infra Part II.A–B.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. See infra Part II.D.
18. See infra Part III.A–B.
19. See infra Part III.C–D.
20. The limits of a philosophical and legal mode of analysis are several:  the
mixture of philosophy with law may reduce the analysis of tolerance and free
speech to a non-legal mode of analysis, merely proposing a philosophy as to free
speech.  See BUNKER, supra note 12, at 59–60 (quoting PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITU-
TIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 12–13 (1982)) (detailing the diffi-
culties of interdisciplinary analysis of law and ultimately finding several methods of
constitutional analysis:  historical, textual, structural, prudential doctrinal, and
prudential).
21. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
22. Id. at 53.
23. Espionage Act of 1917 § 3, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (repealed 1921).
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World War I.24  Schenck was a Socialist Party general secretary, and
the pamphlet alleged that war was a form of despotism and called
for citizens to rise up against the state.25  Schenck argued that the
First Amendment prevented Congress from criminalizing his anti-
war activism.26  The Court, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, rejected Schenck’s First Amendment defense.  Justice
Holmes considered “whether the words used [were] used in such
circumstances and [were] of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they [would] bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent.”27  The Court found that the
pamphlet created the same type of danger as a man falsely shouting
“fire” in a crowded theater.28  Ultimately, the Court held that the
needs of war required suppressing speech that, in peace, would
have been permissible.29  Sedition in war created a clear danger to
Congress’s wartime goal of military recruitment.30
Justice Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test for determin-
ing whether the government could censor speech persisted in Debs
v. United States,31 which Justice Holmes also authored.  In Debs,
Eugene Victor Debs, a prominent Socialist politician and activist,
appealed a conviction for incitement and obstruction of military
conscription under the Espionage Act.32  The Court held that
Schenck disposed of any First Amendment protections afforded to
Debs.33  The Court affirmed Debs’s conviction, relying again on the
danger that his speech posed to the military’s recruitment efforts.34
24. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49.
25. Id. at 49, 51.
26. Id. at 49.
27. Id. at 52.
28. Id. (“The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.  It does not even
protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the
effect of force.”).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 53 (deferring to military goals is consistent with a vast deference in
America’s jurisprudence to war-time goals).  For another example of constitutional
rights being subordinated to war, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
31. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919).
32. Id. at 212.  For the content of the speech for which Debs was imprisoned,
see Eugene Victor Debs, Speech at Canton, Ohio (June 16, 1918), https://bit.ly/
1HIJee4 [https://perma.cc/5WKH-EEN5] (“You need at this time especially to
know that you are fit for something better than slavery and cannon fodder.  You
need to know that you were not created to work and produce and impoverish
yourself to enrich an idle exploiter.”).
33. Debs, 249 U.S. at 215 (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919)).
34. Id. at 216.
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While Justice Holmes’s  subsequent dissents and concurrences
would eventually add nuance to First Amendment jurisprudence,
the Court continued to sanction governmental restrictions on
speech.35
In Abrams v. United States,36 the Court upheld the convictions
of several Russian radicals under the Espionage Act by applying
the “clear and present danger” test.37  The Abrams Court empha-
sized the defendants’ “otherness,” which distinguished their politics
and their national origin as both dangerous and unpatriotic.38  No-
tably, Justice Holmes dissented in this case on the grounds that the
supposed threat of the speech was an abstraction.39  Justice Holmes,
departing from his previous jurisprudence,40 likened free speech to
a market of ideas, wherein citizens choose from the disseminated
ideas and determine the weak opinions from the strong.41  How-
ever, Justice Holmes did not abandon the “clear and present dan-
ger” test, instead relying on the nature of what the pamphlets
advocated—in this case, non-intervention in the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion.42  Justice Holmes distinguished this reasoning from his
Schenck decision because the context of the speech had changed; in
Schenck, the United States was at war, whereas in Abrams, it was
not.43
The Court continued to sanction political censorship in Gitlow
v. New York.44 In Gitlow, the Court upheld the defendant’s convic-
35. See Steven J. Heyman, The Dark Side of the Force: The Legacy of Justice
Holmes for First Amendment Jurisprudence, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 661,
678–85 (2011) (summarizing how Holmes’s jurisprudence reflects a power dynamic
in democratic society wherein suppression of dissidence is logical, but it is desira-
ble to have conflicting opinions in the public sphere to improve our own views).
36. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
37. Id. at 624.
38. Id. at 617 (“All of the five defendants were born in Russia.  They were
intelligent, had considerable schooling, and at the time they were arrested they had
lived in the United States [in] terms varying from five to ten years, but none of
them had applied for naturalization.”); see also Mark Kessler, Legal Discourse and
Political Intolerance: The Ideology of Clear and Present Danger, 27 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 559, 569–73 (1993) (discussing the racial or ideological underpinnings of the
“clear and present danger” test).
39. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting that the only
“disruption” to the United States was advocacy against intervention in Bolshevik
Russia).
40. Kessler, supra note 38, at 579 (noting that while Holmes did not change
his belief in “clear and present danger” he found the pamphlets to be silly).
41. Id. at 630 (“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market . . . .”).
42. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
43. Id. at 630–31.
44. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 671–72 (1925).
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tion under New York’s anarchy statute,45 which criminalized the ad-
vocacy of overthrowing the government.46  Gitlow was a left-wing
Socialist and board member of the Revolutionary Age, a left-wing
publication.47  Gitlow arranged the printing and distribution of a
manifesto detailing the left-wing section of the Socialist Party’s pol-
icies and goals.48  Specifically, the manifesto advocated for political
action by Socialists to capitalize on economic and social unrest,
caused by labor strikes, to ultimately yield social change in the
country through revolt.49  The Court applied the “clear and present
danger” test to uphold the New York statute as a valid exercise of
state power to proscribe action, but it noted that the abstract teach-
ing or musings about a doctrine was permissible.50  Justice Holmes
dissented, insisting that there was no “clear and present danger”
from the publication of such a manifesto and noting “[e]very idea is
an incitement.”51  Justice Holmes noted that the manifesto merely
stated the theory and desirability of an undetermined uprising but
constituted no present threat.52
The Court continued applying the “clear and present danger”
test in Whitney v. California.53  The Court was presented with a left-
wing advocate convicted under an anti-syndicalism statute54 for
45. Id. at 669–70.  Specifically, New York Penal Law criminalized “criminal
anarchy” which was “the doctrine that organized government should be over-
thrown by force or violence, or by assassination of the executive head or of any of
the executive officials of government, or by any unlawful means.  The advocacy of
such doctrine either by word of mouth or writing is a felony.” Id. at 654.
46. Id. at 654 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.15 (McKinney 2018) (originally
enacted and cited as N.Y. PENAL Law §§ 160–161 (1909))).
47. Id. at 655.
48. Id. at 655–56.
49. Id. at 657–58.
50. Id. at 665.
51. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
54. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11401–02 (1919) (repealed 1991).  The relevant text
includes:
The term “criminal syndicalism” as used in this act is hereby defined as
any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the
commission of crime, sabotage (which word is hereby defined as meaning
wilful and malicious physical damage or injury to physical property), or
unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or
effecting any political change.
Sec. 2. Any person who: . . . 4.  Organizes or assists in organizing, or is or
knowingly becomes a member of, any organization, society, group or as-
semblage of persons organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid
and abet criminal syndicalism.
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membership in the Communist Party.55  The Court held that the
statute was not “unreasonable” towards the aims of preventing un-
lawful action against the state.56  In doing so, the Court effectively
sanctioned political speech suppression if the speech or advocacy
“threatened” the state.57  Justices Brandeis and Holmes concurred
with the disposition of the case, but did so by relying on evidence of
actual conspiracy by the defendants with Californian Communist
Party members.58
Justice Brandeis, in criticizing the Court’s implicit endorsement
of censorship, noted the “[f]ear of serious injury cannot alone jus-
tify suppression of free speech and assembly.”59  Justice Brandeis
further noted, “Men feared witches and burnt women.  It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational
fears.”60  Justice Brandeis urged the Court to adopt larger protec-
tions for speech to sift through evil ideas through discourse, rather
than suppression.61
Yet, the Court did not limit its regulation of free speech to po-
litical speech.  In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,62 the Court upheld
a New Hampshire statute criminalizing offensive speech towards
another in a public place when the speaker has the “intent to de-
ride, offend or annoy him.”63  Distributing literature that de-
nounced religion as a “racket” and caused a public stir resulted in
Chaplinsky’s conviction.64  When a marshal attempted to remove
Chaplinsky, Chaplinsky referred to the marshal as a “‘?God
damned racketeer? and ?a damned Fascist.?’”65  The Court upheld
Chaplinsky’s conviction because the statute prohibited the use of
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 359–60.
55. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 366.
56. Id. at 372.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 376.
60. Id. Further, Justice Brandeis stated, “There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.  There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.” Id.  Justice Bran-
deis, while acknowledging there was a conspiracy in the present case, required ac-
tual harm to justify censorship. Id.
61. Id. at 377 (“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.  Only an emergency can justify re-
pression.”).  Yet, Justice Brandeis does not define what constitutes “evil,” a distinc-
tion Kessler notes.  Kessler, supra note 38, at 578.
62. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
63. Id. at 569.
64. Id. at 570.
65. Id. (quoting Complaint, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) (No. 225)).
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“classical fighting words,” words which would plainly excite listen-
ers to breach the peace.66  The Court reasoned that these restric-
tions limited criminalization to the public space and narrowly
punished verbal acts, rather than the content of the speech.67  While
the Court in Chaplinksy required an act to justify censorship, the
specter of Schenck and its progeny questioned this distinction.68
When did speech become an act and thus punishable by the state?
In the 1950s, the Court would find that association was enough
“speech” to constitutionally criminalize such an act.
B. McCarthy-Era Regulations
The Smith Act69 altered the political and social landscape of
the First Amendment, relying on the threat of international Soviet
Communism to criminalize and censor Communist ideas, activism,
and advocacy.70  The Justice Department used the Smith Act as a
weapon to prosecute communists as it was “easy to prove that com-
munists [had] made communist speeches and read communist
books.”71  Ultimately, the Smith Act targeted those who sympa-
thized with left-wing causes, Soviet or otherwise, and left hundreds
either unemployed or labelled as criminals for mere association.72
In Dennis v. United States,73 the Court upheld the Smith Act
despite the defendants’ claims that the Smith Act violated their
First Amendment rights.74  The defendants were leaders of the U.S.
66. Id. at 573.
67. Id. at 574.
68. Id. at 571 (“[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”).
69. Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2018).  Section 2385 criminalizes advocating
the “duty” or “necessity” of overthrowing the government of the United States by
force or violence. Id.
70. See Mark A. Sheft, The End of the Smith Act Era: A Legal and Historical
Analysis of Scales v. United States, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 164, 165–66 (1992)
(detailing the legislature and the Justice Department’s support for a sedition law
against political subversives).  While initially written to forbid aliens from advocat-
ing the violent overthrow of the government, the bill was expanded by Represent
of Representatives after 12 minutes of debate. Id.
71. Id. at 167 (quoting C. HERMAN PRICHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SU-
PREME COURT, 1957-1960, at 66–67 (1961)).
72. See Geoffrey Stone, Free Speech in the Age of McCarthy: A Cautionary
Tale, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1387, 1400 (2005) (noting that “[m]ore than 11,000 people
were fired from federal, state, local, or private employment for alleged
disloyalty”).
73. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See also Claudius O. John-
son, The Status of Freedom of Expression Under the Smith Act, 11 W. POL. Q. 469,
473 (1958) (detailing the theoretical shifts from the sedition statutes to the Smith
Act).
74. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 516.
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Communist Party and were convicted of transforming the World
War II-era Communist Political Association75 into the Communist
Party during the Cold War.76  The Court upheld their convictions
using Judge Learned Hand’s modified “clear and present danger”
test, factoring in the danger posed by the speech in conducting its
analysis:  “‘[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ?evil,? dis-
counted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as is necessary to avoid the danger.’”77  The danger in question was
the threat of government abolishment; thus, a compelling “clear
and present danger” was the overthrowing of the United States
government.78
The Court emphasized that the Communist Party’s develop-
ment as a “highly organized conspiracy” was a justifiable danger to
warrant criminal conviction, even though, from 1945 to 1948, there
had never been an attempt to overthrow the United States govern-
ment.79  The mere organizing of a political party that theoretically
could turn into a violent coup was enough to constitute criminal
activity.80  Effectively, the “clear and present” danger test of Gitlow
and Debs changed from present danger to theoretically possible
danger, based on the size, values, and potential of the Communist
Party.81
75. Id. at 498 n.1.  The Court provides the following history:
Following the dissolution of the Communist International in 1943, the
Communist Party of the United States dissolved and was reconstituted as
the Communist Political Association.  The program of this Association
was one of cooperation between labor and management, and, in general,
one designed to achieve national unity and peace and prosperity in the
post-war period.
Id.
76. Id. at 498 (noting the petitioners changed the Communist Political Associ-
ation into the Communist Party, which aligned with the Soviet Union’s Communist
ideology).
77. Id. at 510 (citing United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir.
1950)).
78. Id. at 508.
79. Id. at 511.
80. Id.  Further, Justice Frankfurter concurred with the judgment, not because
of a “clear and present danger,” but because of national security reasons. Id. at
547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
81. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 511–12.  The jury instructions noted:
[Y]ou cannot find the defendants or any of them guilty of the crime
charged unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that they con-
spired to organize a society, group and assembly of persons who teach
and advocate the overthrow or destruction of the Government of the
United States by force and violence and to advocate and teach the duty
and necessity of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the
United States by force and violence, with the intent that such teaching
and advocacy be of a rule or principle of action and by language reasona-
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After Dennis, the Smith Act returned to plague the Court in
Yates v. United States.82  The Yates defendants were 14 members of
a conspiracy to “advocate and teach the duty and necessity of over-
throwing the Government of the United States by force and vio-
lence,” and organize the Communist Party.83  The defendants
brought two claims to challenge their convictions:  first, the defend-
ants argued that the term “organize” was erroneously interpreted;
thus, the jury instructions were erroneous.84  Second, the petition-
ers claimed that the jury instructions were erroneous because they
did not require “incitement to action.”85
The Court, in resolving the appellants’ first issue, relied upon
its Dennis decision and held that the term “organize” meant an es-
tablishment or founding of a new organization.86  Turning to the
second issue, the Court defined “advocate” in the Smith Act as:87
The kind of advocacy and teaching which is charged and upon
which your verdict must be reached is not merely a desirability
but a necessity that the Government of the United States be
overthrown and destroyed by force and violence and not merely
a propriety but a duty to overthrow and destroy the Government
of the United States by force and violence.88
The trial court refused to distinguish between advocacy per se
and advocacy with a purpose towards incitement.89  The Court
found that the trial court had misconstrued the difference between
advocacy “of forcible overthrow as an abstract doctrine and advo-
bly and ordinarily calculated to incite persons to such action, all with the
intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of the Government of the
United States by force and violence as speedily as circumstances would
permit.
Id.
82. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), overruled by Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (overruling the partial acquittal of some defendants and
orders granting new trials to cure inadequate proof).
83. Id. at 300 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2018)).
84. Id. at 303.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 304.  The defendants argued the word “‘organize’ means to ‘estab-
lish,’ ‘found,’ or ‘bring into existence,’ and that in this sense the Communist Party
was organized by 1945 at the latest.” Id.  Defendants argued that because they
were indicted in 1951, the statute of limitations had run. Id. The Court found
“organize” undefined by both the statute and the legislative history. Id. at 305–07.
However, the Court noted the Smith Act specifically targeted the Communist
Party. Id. at 308.
87. Id. at 312.
88. Id. at 313 n.18 (quoting United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 906,
935 (S.D. Cal. 1952)).
89. Id. at 317–18.
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cacy of action to that end,” and thus misconstrued Dennis.90  Fur-
thermore, the Court found conviction must lie in the advocacy to do
something, now or in the future.91
Turning to the defendants’ convictions, the Court affirmed the
convictions for five of the Yates defendants based on their mere
membership in the Communist Party.92  However, the Court found
that the other nine defendants were activists because they attended
classes teaching “sabotage and street fighting, in order to divert and
diffuse the resistance of the authorities and if possible to seize local
vantage points.”93  Thus, the Court remanded the case for a new
trial to find whether the defendants’ advocacy passed the threshold
into overt acts.94
Justices Black and Douglas jointly dissented on the same
grounds as their individual dissents in Dennis.95  Justice Black,
though agreeing with the Court’s construction of “organize,”96
would have reversed every conviction because he believed that the
First Amendment forbade Congress from creating laws like the
Smith Act.97  Justice Black noted that under the Court’s approach,
convictions rested upon merely “agreeing to talk as distinguished
from agreeing to act.”98  Justice Black further noted that Smith Act
prosecutions were indistinguishable from the same authoritarian
governments the First Amendment sought to prevent.99  In time,
the Court would adopt Justice Black’s free-speech jurisprudence, as
the Court moved further and further away from supporting govern-
ment censorship.
C. Brandenburg and the Non-Incitement of Hate Speech
Brandenburg v. Ohio100 presented the next evolutionary step
in the Court’s free-speech jurisprudence.  Brandenburg, a leader of
an Ohio Ku Klux Klan group, was convicted101 under Ohio’s Crimi-
90. Id. at 320.
91. Id. at 325; see also Johnson, supra note 73, at 477.
92. Yates, 354 U.S. at 330.
93. Id. at 331.
94. Id. at 333.
95. Compare Yates, 354 U.S. at 339 (Black, J., dissenting), with Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (Douglas, J., dissenting), and Dennis, 341 U.S. at
579 (Black, J., dissenting).
96. Yates, 354 U.S. at 340 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 344.
100. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
101. Id. at 444–45.
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nal Syndicalism statute.102  The evidence supporting his conviction
consisted of tapes describing a possible “revengeance” that advo-
cated for the forced relocation of African-Americans to Africa and
Jewish people to Israel.103  The Court found the syndicalism statute
unconstitutional104 because the Constitution prevents state censor-
ship unless the advocacy aims towards incitement or producing im-
minent “lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.”105  Thus, Brandenburg requires a court to determine
whether speech will incite listeners to commit imminent, lawless ac-
tivity prior to enforcing censorship.106
The Court began a decisive move towards free-speech absolu-
tism107 in R.A.V. v. St. Paul.108  There, confronted by a cross burn-
ing inside a local black family’s fenced-in property, the Court
invalidated a Minnesota statute prohibiting the action:
[O]n public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burn-
ing cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender. . . .109
102. Id. (“[A]dvocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabo-
tage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing in-
dustrial or political reform.”  (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13)).  For the
modern version of the statute struck down in Brandenburg, see OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2917.01 (West 2018).
103. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.  Further, the tapes showed participants
with weaponry and a cross burning. Id. at 445–46.
104. Id. at 448.  This effectively overruled Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
371 (1927) (holding the California Anti-Syndicalism Act criminalizing the advo-
cacy of violent means to effect political change involved such danger to the state as
to allow the state to regulate it).  The Court noted that subsequent decisions of
Dennis and Yates discredit the criminalization of mere advocacy. See Branden-
burg, 395 U.S. at 447–48.
105. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.  Justices Black and Douglas concurred in
the result. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (Black, J., concur-
ring).  However, Justice Douglas found the Brandenburg test still problematic be-
cause of its inherent reliance on the “clear and present danger” jurisprudence of
the past, allowing for incitement to be regulated. Id. at 455 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
106. See Larry Alexander, Incitement and Freedom of Speech, in FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY 101, 107–114 (David Kretzmer &
Francine Kershman Hazan eds., 2000) (discussing the Brandenburg test and how it
seems to insulate the speaker from their speech’s results).
107. An absolutist view of free speech would be that of Justice Hugo Black:
“I believe that the First Amendment forbids Congress to punish people for talking
about public affairs, whether or not such discussion incites to action, legal or ille-
gal.”  Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 340 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting).
108. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992).
109. Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990), invali-
dated by R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391)).
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Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found the statute to en-
gage in “content-based regulations,” that would discriminate solely
based on the content of the speech—such as speech that states the
President is a fascist.110  Justice Scalia noted that there were several
categories of speech that the Court could, consistent with the First
Amendment, regulate because of their “constitutionally proscrib-
able content.”111  Specifically, Justice Scalia allowed for the regula-
tion of secondary effects of the speech, but did not allow the
regulation of speech content that may be offensive or harmful.112
Justice Scalia reasoned that if the government proscribed
speech solely because the entire class of speech was subject to regu-
lation because of their effects, then the threat of government view-
point did not exist.113  Thus, threats against the President,114
obscenities,115 and price regulation to prevent fraud116 are all regul-
able, because the purpose of their regulation applies to all types of
speech within that class and does not discriminate against specific
instances of speech.117  Yet, the government may regulate proscrib-
able speech due to its secondary effects, which allows for regulation
without reference to the content.118
The Court held that the R.A.V. ordinance was facially uncon-
stitutional because it regulated fighting words through their connec-
tion with political ideas, resulting in viewpoint discrimination.119
110. Id. at 382.
111. Id. at 383.  Justice Scalia described several exemptions, the first being the
government’s ability to proscribe libel generally, but not seditious libel. Id. at 384.
Further, child pornography could be proscribed. Id.  One could proscribe threats
against the President. Id. at 388.  Finally, the state may regulate “secondary ef-
fects” of speech. Id.
112. Id. at 386.  The Court effectively allows for the “non-verbal” or “non-
communicative” aspects of speech to be regulated but not the underlying message
of the speech; thus, blending the two concepts when hate speech is implicated. Id.
at 386–87.
113. Id. at 388.
114. Id. (noting the Court had upheld the facial validity of the threat against
the president statute in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)).
115. Id. (stating the state may regulate a sexual obscenity but not an obscenity
which includes an offensive political message); see also Kurcharek v. Hanaway, 902
F.2d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding an obscenity statute constitutional when ob-
scenities as a whole are regulated).
116. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumers Councils, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976) (upholding a Virginia law
prohibiting a pharmacist from publishing, advertising or promoting the price of
prescription drugs)).
117. Id. at 388–89.
118. Id. at 389.
119. Id. at 391; see also Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party, 373 N.E.2d 21
(Ill. 1978).  In Skokie, the court, despite the testimony that the Nazi threat was to
show “‘that we are not through with you,’” rejected the circuit court’s injunction
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Notably, Justice Scalia dismissed a potential due-process argu-
ment.120  He asserted that even if the purpose behind the ordinance
was to ensure the basic human rights of groups historically discrimi-
nated against, the danger of censorship required limited circum-
stances prior to use of the equal protection argument.121  Thus, the
Court favored, albeit unintentionally, free-speech principles over
the rights of those threatened by the speech.122
Virginia v. Black123 is the latest demonstration of the Court’s
ideological shift in free-speech jurisprudence.  In Black, the Court
invalidated a portion of a Virginia statute criminalizing the burning
of a cross with the intent to intimidate a person or group of per-
sons.124  The statute included a provision establishing that such
burning of a cross was prima facie proof of intent to intimidate.125
The Court held that the prohibition on cross burning was consistent
with R.A.V. because it fit one of the narrow exemptions of R.A.V.;
it banned an action, not any specified viewpoint expressed via cross
burning.126  However, the Court held that the prima facie element
of the statute was unconstitutional as interpreted by the jury in-
struction and created a risk of idea censorship.127
Dissenting, Justice Thomas rejected the majority’s reasoning
that one burns a cross for a plethora of reasons, noting that the sole
against the display of swastikas in the march. Skokie, 373 N.E.2d at 22.  The court
rejected the “fighting words” doctrine, limiting it solely to words which directly
cause violence. Id. at 23–25 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20–29 (1971)).
The court conceptualized the display of a swastika as a political act, divorced from
the effect of the display of the swastika in a predominantly Jewish Community. Id.
at 24.  Further, the court reasoned that the suppression of unpopular speech would
lead to general suppression. Id. at 25 (citing Rockwell v. Morris, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25
(App. Div. 1961)).
120. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395 (finding the statute was not narrowly tailored and
singled out bias against a viewpoint).
121. Id.
122. See Mari J. Matsuda & Charles R. Lawrence III, Epilogue: Burning
Crosses and the R.A.V. Case, in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 133, 135 (1993) [hereinafter
Epilogue] (discussing the R.A.V. case and its ignorance of minority rights).
123. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
124. Id. at 348 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 362–63 (finding the burning of the cross with the purpose to intimi-
date was within R.A.V. exception).
127. Id. at 366–67 (holding the jury instruction unconstitutional).  The jury
instructions, in discussing the mens rea of the crime, noted cross burning “by itself,
is sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required intent.” Id. at 364.
The Court believed this instruction created an “unacceptable risk of the suppres-
sion of ideas.” Id. at 365.  Such instruction created a risk of undeliberated convic-
tions without determining if the cross burning was intended to intimidate. Id. at
367.
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group engaged in cross burning in the United States was the Ku
Klux Klan.128  Justice Thomas emphasized the historical effects of
intimidation on the black community, noting that the Klan used
cross burnings as a method to inspire terror among all minority
communities.129  Justice Thomas argued that the intent of the stat-
ute was to prevent the Klan from reemerging prior to desegregation
in the American South, rendering the concern that the state sought
to censor the Klan historically inaccurate.130  Finally, Justice
Thomas rejected the majority’s belief that the statute’s prima facie
instruction was irrebuttable because a defendant could provide evi-
dence to rebut that presumption.131
As the cases above demonstrate, the First Amendment has
moved beyond the “clear and present danger” test of Schenck.132
Now, the ability of the state to regulate speech requires purposeful
incitement towards imminent, rather than potential, lawless action
or harm to the state and its interests.133  However, this development
has moved from discrimination of ideas to ignoring the harms those
ideas cause in communities.134  Understanding why society would
tolerate ideas that harm communities is vital to understanding the
scope of the First Amendment; for this reason, we turn to the philo-
sophical underpinnings of the First Amendment.
D. John Stuart Mill and the Marketplace of Ideas
Fundamentally, the First Amendment protects the marketplace
of ideas.135  John Stuart Mill, the eminent English philosopher, gave
a traditional rationale for freedom of speech:  if we cannot socially
parse out the false information, and instead suppress what is false,
we deny others the ability to reason and learn.136  Additionally,
128. Id. at 388–89 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Specifically, the majority alleged
that Scottish tribes burned crosses to communicate and thus stood for the proposi-
tion that one may burn a cross for a plethora of reason. Id. at 352.
129. Id. at 390–92.
130. Id. at 394.
131. Id. at 397.
132. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
133. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
134. Epilogue, supra note 122, at 135.
135. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); see also Jared Schroeder, Shifting the Metaphor: Examining Discursive Influ-
ences on the Supreme Court’s Use of the Marketplace Metaphor in Twenty-First-
Century Free Expression Cases, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 383, 412–30 (2016) (discuss-
ing the use of discourse theory in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and describ-
ing different contexts of the “marketplace of ideas,” which refers to the ability of
citizens to choose the dominant ideas among the “market”).
136. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 36 (Andrew UK Ltd. 2011) (1859)
(ebook) (“Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but
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suppression could potentially censor a truth clouded in false-
hoods.137  Further, censorship prevents the truth from being reex-
amined as society progresses, and ultimately, what was once true at
a particular time, could become a dogmatic truism at a later time.138
Thus, a dogmatic pronouncement of “the truth” instills fear in the
uneducated and restricts their freedom to understand or choose
what is right or true.139  By engaging in discourse, truth reveals it-
self and the “number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or
doubted will be constantly on the increase.”140
However, censorship is a dualistic principle:  the majority may
not censor the minority, nor can the minority control the majority
by seeking refuge from criticism.141  Through discourse, our own
thoughts face others:  “forgetting that the unlikeness of one person
to another is generally the first thing which draws the attention of
either to the imperfection of his own type, and the superiority of
another, or the possibility, by combining the advantages of both, of
producing something better than either.”142
Further, Mill recognizes potential limitations of freedom of
speech.  Similar to the “clear and present danger” test, Mill notes:
An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that pri-
vate property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply
circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment
when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the
house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same
mob in the form of a placard.143
This quote enounces Mill’s harm principle, wherein govern-
ment may regulate speech that incites violence when harm could
occur to others.144  The only proper limit to speech is to protect
others from harm.145  Mill does not suppose the harm principle is a
sufficient condition for intervention; rather, it is a necessary condi-
facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before
it.”).
137. Id. at 30.
138. Id. at 38.  Mill uses the example of Christianity which was once perse-
cuted and viewed as heresy by Marcus Aurelius and which later evolved into an
oppressive religion. Id. at 42–43.  Further, Mill argues that by censoring opinions
the state increases the social stigma associated with them and radicalizes such
opinions. Id. at 42.
139. Id. at 44.
140. Id. at 53.
141. Id. at 29.
142. Id. at 79.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 24.
145. Id. at 64.
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tion for intervention.146  However, Mill concedes that actions that
cause harm establish a “prima facie case for punish[ment] . . . by
law.”147  A common issue traps the harm principle as well as the
clear and present danger and Brandenburg tests:  ambiguity in what
meets these standards.148
Despite writing in the 1800s, Mill, alongside Immanuel Kant
and John Milton,149 remains a paradigm liberal philosopher of free
speech.150  Recently, Timothy Garton Ash stands as an authority on
Millian principles in the public sphere.151  Ash argues that govern-
ments must limit speech regulation as much as possible while simul-
taneously developing shared norms to allow for mutual
understanding.152  Ash endorses a Millian position of harm which
requires objective pain or consequence, while subjective offense or
psychological effects are not enough to warrant regulation.153
Speech becomes regulatable only when it is dangerous speech.154
Dangerous speech modernizes the Brandenburg test, which re-
quires questioning whether the speaker intends violence, whether
violence is likely, and whether violence is temporally imminent.155
146. MILL, supra note 136, at 100 (“[I]t must by no means be supposed, be-
cause damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify
the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such
interference.”).
147. Id. at 25.
148. See generally David Brink, Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Aug. 21, 2018), https://stanford.io/
2GLxP6P [https://perma.cc/2LND-7QJ9] (discussing the ramifications of a weak
principle for regulation versus a stronger justification).  Specifically, what are the
societal interests which are “harmed” and how powerful must those interests be?
149. See generally Helga Varden, A Kantian Conception of Free Speech, in
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN A DIVERSE WORLD 39 (Deirdre Golash ed., 2010)
(describing Immanuel Kant as another liberal political philosopher who viewed the
state as necessary to provide protections for citizens as the state represents no
individual person); see also Schroeder, supra note 135, at 390 (discussing how John
Milton influenced the founder’s thinking as to American freedoms).
150. See Steven P. Lee, Hate Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas, in FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION IN A DIVERSE WORLD 13, 24–25 (Deirdre Golash ed., 2010) (dis-
cussing Millian principles towards hate speech).  Lee contends that hate speech
regulation requires a discussion of the risks of government misuse of that author-
ity. Id. at 24.  Further, the realization of free speech forces us to confront the
undermining effect of this speech on tolerance and diversity. Id. at 25.  However,
it is the purpose of this Comment to critique why government regulates and con-
trols speech.
151. See TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, FREE SPEECH: TEN PRINCIPLES FOR A CON-
NECTED WORLD 75 (2016).
152. Id. at 81.
153. Id. at 89.
154. Id. at 135.
155. Id. at 135–37 (citing Susan Benesch, Dangerous Speech: A Proposal to
Prevent Group Violence, DANGEROUS SPEECH PROJECT (Feb. 23, 2013), https://
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-2\DIK205.txt unknown Seq: 20 30-JAN-19 12:49
536 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:517
The state, to protect all citizen’s rights, must actively protect those
whose speech is legitimate while punishing those who intend to in-
cite violence.156
For example, the state could not prohibit a provocateur from
threatening to expose undocumented students, but if the provocat-
eur were to advocate violence against said students and knows that
those listening would engage in such violence, then the state could
hold them responsible.157  Thus, liberalism requires unregulated
speech in most circumstances, with censorship used only in the rare
circumstances of violence or imminent violence.
The Supreme Court’s Brandenburg analysis embodies the free
speech of liberal political philosophy; yet, this mode of analysis ig-
nores the question of who benefits from the wild west of free
speech.
III. CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL SPEECH AND THE VIOLENCE OF
SPEECH ITSELF
A. The Broken Marketplace
The philosophy of John Stuart Mill and Justice Holmes per-
vade American jurisprudence through the market place of ideas
metaphor.158  Yet, such analysis of American jurisprudence ignores
the real politick of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurispru-
dence, wherein the marketplace of ideas analogy assumes that the
marketplace is a fair and tolerant one—much like an economic
market.159
bit.ly/2A5Ugxy [https://perma.cc/P482-WYFJ]).  Ash also adopts the framework of
Susan Benesch in determining when hate speech becomes violent:  whether the
speaker has a powerful influence, whether there is a vulnerable and impressiona-
ble audience, whether the speech act is a call to violence, whether there is a social
or historical context of violence, and whether the dissemination is influential itself.
Id. at 135–37.
156. Id. at 140–44 (discussing civic responsibility and the Charlie Hebdo
cartoons and the lack of support those creators had because of fear of violence to
support their position).
157. See Maya Oppenheim, UC Berkeley Protests: Milo Yiannopoulos
Planned to ‘Publicly Name Undocumented Students’ in Cancelled Talk, INDEPEN-
DENT (Feb. 3, 2017), https://ind.pn/2tGHwua [https://perma.cc/R33P-U6LF] (dis-
cussing the use of “speaking” events to harass undocumented students).
158. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (describing the free trade
of ideas); see also Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination
of John Stuart Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 80 (2010) (noting the different justifications for free
speech by Mill and Holmes).
159. Schonsheck, supra note 11, at 34–35 (noting unlike a real market, the
marketplace of ideas does not require exchanges of ideas, but rather the speaker
retains their ideas regardless of opposing ideas).
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The First Amendment, rather than promoting the exchange of
ideas, becomes a means of ideological entrenchment, wherein ideas
never leave the public discourse because they are prima facie a “po-
tential truth”:  Holocaust denial possesses the same “truth” value as
anti-racism or anti-sexism.160  The Supreme Court, rather than
grapple with the secondary effects of its free-speech jurisprudence,
has accepted the entrenchment and protection of hate speech at the
cost of minority communities in the service of powerful socioeco-
nomic groups and ideologies.161
Freedom of speech, like “any political right in general, is not
measured by some sort of abstract scheme of ‘justice,’ or in terms of
any other bourgeois-democratic phrases, but by the social and eco-
nomic relationships for which it is designed.”162  Rather than ana-
lyzing political rights in a vacuum, we must analyze these rights
within the larger social, economic, and political frameworks that
rights exist within, if we hope to understand what values they pro-
tect and what values they harm.163
A philosophical analysis must ask how society produces, repro-
duces, and interprets values.164  Those who interpret these values
are a professional class of people, “intellectuals,” such as social and
160. Steven P. Lee, Hate Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas, in FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION IN A DIVERSE WORLD 13, 20–25 (Deirdre Golash ed., 2010) (analyz-
ing the marketplace of analogies in economic terms and finding justification for
regulation because hate speech functions like a negative market externality).
161. Contra JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE
RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE 104–17 (1999) (arguing that while
free speech can rightfully be seen as reinforcing some social norms, the civil rights
movement shows an instance wherein the free speech of civil rights activists was
instrumental to prevent state oppression of civil rights activists).  Further, Wein-
stein argues that characterizing free speech as either an ally or nemesis to equality
is a false narrative and requires careful analysis of the specific regulation at work.
Id. at 123.  For a concise summation of the court’s role as a reactionary body, see
Robert Hunter, A Reactionary for a Reactionary Body, JACOBIN (Feb. 1, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2RfUooc [https://perma.cc/MN7K-GCXG] (describing the Courts’ in-
stitutional limitations), and Richard Bellamy, The Democratic Qualities of Courts:
A Critical Analysis of Three Arguments, 49 REPRESENTATION 333, 344 (2013) (ar-
guing courts only uphold the people’s democratic values insofar as they are given
legitimacy by the court).
162. Rosa Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution, in THE ROSA LUXEMBURG
READER 281, 302 (Peter Hudis & Kevin B. Anderson eds., 2004).  It should be
noted the original context of Luxemburg’s analysis was suffrage. Id.
163. Id. (noting the Soviet concept of suffrage was developed within the con-
text of the transition from tsarist Russia to a revolutionary government).  For ex-
amples of how larger societal interests impact the development of constitutional
rights, see Johnson, supra note 73, at 473 (noting that Justice Frankfurter found
justification in national security for the Smith Act).
164. See Antonio Gramsci, The Prison Notebooks: The Intellectuals, in AN
ANTHOLOGY OF WESTERN MARXISM: FROM LUKÁCS AND GRAMSCI TO SOCIAL-
IST-FEMINISM 112, 117–18 (Roger Gottlieb ed., 1989).
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political elites who determine how society values norms.165  This
class includes the judiciary which, having the “province and duty”
to say what the law is, determines the scope of any right, and thus
the underlying rationale of the right.166
In the case of First Amendment jurisprudence, the right to free
speech existed, albeit qualified by fundamental American socioeco-
nomic norms and hierarchies.167  Through interpretation, the right
to free speech exists to the extent the Court deems it worth existing,
often benefitting those not in the minority but in the majority.168
Juxtaposed to the elite intellectual, a non-politically powerful citi-
zen is unable to express themselves freely; they may only express
themselves within the confines of what is acceptable to the overall
social power structure, whether it be in the face of the Red Scare or
in the unregulated market of today.169
Yet, one could argue that the fundamental value of free speech
remains because of tolerance and that the Court has moved away
from its mistakes in upholding the Smith Act.170  Regardless of
whether racist speech begets violence, so long as the speech does
not meet the causal “incitement” test of Brandenburg, it remains a
“valid” part of the community discourse, despite societal condem-
nation and its potential harm or offense to the community.171  Tol-
165. Id. The intellectual class includes judges who function as “‘[t]echnicians
of repression’ and ‘moral and intellectual leaders.’” See Pablo Ciocchini &
Stefanie Khoury, A Gramscian Approach to Studying the Judicial Decision-Making
Process, 26 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 75, 77 (2018).
166. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
167. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211, 214 (1919).
168. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT
60–71 (2014) (describing the history of the Court upholding speech regulations
when threatened by subversion or anti-war sentiments).
169. Thus, in a case like R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), the ideology
of freedom of speech outweighed the rights of African-American peoples to be
free from racism, implicitly suggesting that racism is a right more enshrined than
the right to be black. See Epilogue, supra note 122, at 135.
170. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see also WEINSTEIN,
supra note 161, at 16–24 (detailing the espionage and Red Scare cases).  Addition-
ally, Weinstein argues that the Brandenburg test functions well in practice and in
theory. Id. at 25.  This Comment does not dispute the uses of the Brandenburg
test, but it considers what we give up when we choose “tolerance” as a political
value. See infra Part III.B.
171. But see Sean E. Mulholland, White Supremacist Groups and Hate Crime,
157 PUB. CHOICE 91, 109 (2013) (finding that the presence of white supremacist
chapters in a county raises the overall hate crime rate by 19.1 percent).
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erance of ideas remains a vital component of democracy, even if it
carries negative repercussions.172
However, when discussing the benefits of free speech, we too
often ignore the potential costs that this value has imposed on ra-
tional democracy and minority communities.173  Tolerance of those
who would dehumanize minority groups begs the question:  is this
tolerance worth the cost, or, in the alternative, is this the type of
society foreseen by those who advocated for free speech?
B. Tolerance: What Is It Good for?
Herbert Marcuse, the Frankfurt School philosopher, noted that
tolerance has changed from a means of political discourse to an
“end” that limits discussion because all viewpoints, regardless of
facts or logic, remain tolerated.174  Tolerance, instead of serving
human ends, such as ending war, terror, and oppression, allows the
good and the bad to mingle because tolerance is no longer prac-
ticed.175  Rather than require engagement with alternative view-
points, tolerance allows each viewpoint to co-exist when their
fundamental truth-values are at odds.176
Tolerance does not discriminate the good from the bad or the
conservative from the liberal, but it allows for the expression of
ideas, even when their use is to spread disinformation and cause
actual, empirical harm.177  Historically, tolerance may have been
necessary when repression of ideas and peoples were common-
place, but in today’s world, tolerance serves the interests of the
state.178  This phenomenon requires sober reflection to understand
what benefits hate speech provides to society, given its condemna-
tion by both science and morality alike.179
172. BUNKER, supra note 12, at 16 (“[P]romoting free speech through the
First Amendment helps to teach tolerance by exposing citizens to diverse views
that may not otherwise be inclined to endure.”).
173. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377 (1992).
174. Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLER-
ANCE 81, 82–83 (1965).
175. Id. at 82.
176. Schonsheck, supra note 11, at 35 (noting how despite scientific support,
Darwinian evolutionism is considered to be on the same level of legitimacy, as an
idea, as creationism).
177. Marcuse, supra note 174, at 85; Mulholland, supra note 171, at 109.
178. Id. Marcuse notes those whose “truths” were murdered by the state:
Arnold of Brescia, Hussites, and other members of the Reformation. Id. at 91.
Such state interests include state-violence through the police, armed forces, and
economic suppression of individuals’ voting and buying power. Id. at 85.
179. Id. at 93.
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Turning to American racism, Supreme Court jurisprudence
frustrates community-based attempts to remove or reduce activities
and speech that dehumanize minority groups.180  Rather than pro-
tect the democratic interests of those groups, the Court’s interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment and its values implicitly protect the
interests of racists who burn crosses and display swastikas, leaving
such communities without recourse.181  In striking down content re-
strictions, the Court justifies, through tolerance, protection of pow-
erful interests that create conditions where hate speech flourishes,
rather than respect for humanity.182  Tolerance serves not the inter-
ests of the vulnerable, as often believed, but the interests of those
who possess economic, social, and political power; thus, the Court
too often reinforces the social hierarchies already in place, essen-
tially allowing for cultural entrenchment through the law.183  Thus,
communities cannot progress and decide that such “tolerance” is
illusory because that would reflect “special bias” against viewpoints
like white supremacy.  Under the Court’s jurisprudence, every po-
litical position is as legitimate as any other, regardless of whether its
political ideology seeks to liquidate or deport millions of
Americans.184
However, a more sinister aspect of tolerance may be at play in
American jurisprudence:  when speech threatens the underpinnings
of America’s racial, political, and economic hierarchies, the state
eschews tolerance for stability.185  Further, when communities at-
180. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379–80 (1992) (detailing an anti-Nazi
and cross-burning ordinance).
181. Id. at 415–16 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing the majority miscon-
strues First Amendment values by protecting harassment of minorities).  However,
one should note that Blackmun would have struck down the statute solely on over-
breadth grounds, as opposed to the majority’s shrinking of the “fighting words”
doctrine. Id.
182. Marcuse, supra note 174, at 88 (noting that tolerance cannot be indis-
criminate and equal when life and freedom are at stake).  Rather than protect
minority interests from harassment, the Court implicitly sanctions harassment. See
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396 (describing the ordinance as reflecting special hostility to-
wards particular biases).  The majority neglects to acknowledge the historical and
social meaning of what cross-burnings or swastikas entail. See also Epilogue, supra
note 122, at 135.
183. Marcuse, supra note 174, at 95 (describing the inability of social dissent
to emerge when dominant ideology controls political and media power).
184. Id. at 94.  Thus, while one can find the views such as cross-burning repre-
hensible, one must “tolerate” it in the name of the First Amendment. See also
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347 (2003); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396; Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969).
185. See Luxemburg, supra note 162, at 302.  If we view the right to free
speech within its historical, social reality, when the speech threatens society, it can
be censored. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951) (finding the
Government may act before any revolutionary activity occurs).
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tempt to prohibit hate speech to prevent the fostering of racism, the
Court then weaponizes tolerance to protect hate speech.186  Even-
tually, the proliferation of “fake news,” propaganda, conspiracy
theories, and racialized-science ideas become indoctrinated into the
cultural, social, and political system as legitimate, reinforcing the
same status quo because every idea must be subject to inquiry.187
To move towards a society that can free itself from this confusion,
society must cease accepting tolerance and equal choice of “all
ideas” and move toward an alternative:  recognizing the current re-
gime as “false” tolerance and move towards progressive “true
tolerance.”188
Marcuse argues that for tolerance to flourish, we must be intol-
erant of those viewpoints which eschew empiricism, shared human-
ity, and individuality; in short, we must become intolerant of those
views which paralyze society from progress.189  Thus, society would
be tolerant of speech and actions that work towards the freedom of
individuals, but intolerant of that which seeks to stifle or oppress
those who society oppresses.190  Such practice expresses itself in the
phenomena of “no platforming” of Nazis and other fascists.191  For
a less politically charge example, even the exclusion of hearsay em-
bodies Marcusian principles.192
In short, the type of free speech embodied by Marcusian prin-
ciples does not restrict speech because of its offense, but it does
restrict speech in order to promote a vision of “human diversity”
which seeks to move beyond consumer culture and systemic op-
pression.193  The words of fascists, neo-Nazis, misogynists, and rac-
186. Marcuse, supra note 174, at 104 (noting the concentrated power of deci-
sion makers, even in democratic societies).
187. Id. at 98; see also Michael Barthel et al., Many Americans Believe Fake
News Is Sowing Confusion, PEW RES. CTR: JOURNALISM & MEDIA (Dec. 15, 2016),
https://pewrsr.ch/2h4cNyZ [https://perma.cc/L767-7W8H] (noting 64 percent be-
lieve fake news has caused confusion).
188. Marcuse, supra note 174, at 102–05.  Marcuse further notes that to even
discuss tolerance, we must “re-examine the issue of violence and traditional dis-
tinction between violent and non-violent action.”  Id. at 102.
189. Id. at 100.
190. Id.; see also Clarence Morris, On Liberation and Liberty: Marcuse’s and
Mill’s Essays Compared, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 735, 744 (1970) (detailing Mill and
Marcuse’s different conceptions of liberty).
191. MARK BRAY, ANTIFA: THE ANTI-FASCIST HANDBOOK 148–50 (2017)
(defining no platforming as the act of denying fascists the opportunity to speak).
192. See Brian Leiter, The Case Against Freedom of Speech, 38 SYDNEY L.
REV. 407, 438–39 (2016).  Specifically, hearsay is shown by its untrusty nature to be
harmful to the discourse by an empirical standpoint. Id. at 409.
193. See BRAY, supra note 191, at 149.  For a discussion of the complexities of
who decides what promotes “human diversity,” see infra Part III.C.  This Com-
ment assumes proposals within the present constitutional framework and thus lim-
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ists do not promote human diversity:  by nature the words of these
groups are exclusory of the other (non-whites, women, and
LGBTQ peoples) and exist to destroy or exploit others.194  Thus, to
move forward towards human liberation, society must adjust its
norms to tolerate and promote positions that seek to expand human
flourishing while censoring speech that seeks to harass, harm, or
dehumanize minority groups and reinforce present social norms.195
Yet, who decides what values are and are not tolerable?
C. The Political Values of Free-Speech Absolutism: Implicit
Acceptance of Racism, Sexism, and Warmongering
Because of the American legal regime’s fetish for tolerance,
the high standard for prohibiting speech remains the incitement
standard.196  However, this incitement standard is effectively impos-
sible to meet; if a Nazi march through Skokie and a cross burning
intended to intimidate are not incitement, then what is incite-
ment?197  Conversely, in protecting culturally dehumanizing expres-
sion, such speech harms groups whose human rights become subject
to recurrent litigation.198  By construing speakers who advocate vio-
lence through intimidation and cultural “incitement”199 as not
within the “majority preference,” the Court valued the rights of ra-
cist speakers without examining the potential costs of attempting to
eradicate anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, or Jim Crow beliefs from
its proposals to those that are potentially able to survive strict scrutiny.
Additionally, the frameworks proposed do not and should not be construed to
mean anything offensive is ipso facto within this framework.  Rather, determining
what is within these frameworks requires historical and social groundings.
194. Id.
195. Marcuse, supra note 174, at 102.
196. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969).
197. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S.377, 382 (1992); Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Social-
ist Party, N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978).
198. See Philip N.S. Rumney, The British Experience of Racist Hate Speech
Regulation: A Lesson for First Amendment Absolutists?, 32 COMM. L. WORLD
REV. 117, 136 (2003) (describing free speech as a mechanism to infringe on others’
rights).  It should be noted that this Comment’s analysis is limited solely to hate
speech, which is embodied in cultural, historical, and political exploitation.  The
requirement of empirical evidence for what is and is not “dehumanizing” helps to
limit the potential for suppression.
199. See Albin Eser, The Law of Incitement and the Use of Speech to Incite
Others to Commit Criminal Acts: German Law in Comparative Perspective, in
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY 119, 124 (David
Kretzmer & Francine Kershman Hazan eds., 2000) (discussing the German
criminalization of public incitement and the rationale being the protection of an
indeterminate group of people).  Additionally, unlike the United States, a ratio-
nale for German restrictions of speech is a right of “personal respect.” Id. at 135.
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communities.200  This system of constitutional rights protects the
rights of racist speakers and assumes that the underlying social
foundations are free and equal, whereas in reality, power concen-
trates in fewer hands.201  To ground society in “true” tolerance and
move away from the current regime which uses tolerance as a
means of preserving the status quo, we must rely on rational, empir-
ical evidence in the service of social progress.202
To affect progress, a Marcusian framework would require the
suppression of those hegemonic or culturally ingrained ideas, poli-
cies, and movements that promote regressive social policies that ul-
timately lead to dehumanization.203  However, the fundamental
issue with this solution lies in who decides which ideas are progres-
sive and regressive.204  Marcuse proposes a progressive, equality-
minded technocratic elite.205  These elites would repress regressive
ideas that reinforce social dominance and promote the values of the
oppressed.206  Rather than reinforce power structures as the Court
has, these elite would act to promote progress.207
However, Marcuse’s theory of tolerance begs the fundamental
question, what makes the promotion of a “progressive” educated
elite, and a progressive tolerance, preferable to the neutral attitude
200. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392; see also Sean E. Mulholland, White Suprema-
cist Groups and Hate Crime, 157 PUB. CHOICE 91, 92 (2013) (noting the increasing
level of hate-group chapters in the United States).
201. Marcuse, supra note 174, at 92.  To move beyond tolerance towards pro-
gress of humanity at large, we must not examine constitutional rights and apply
values like tolerance and progress to them, but we must flip this order to put pro-
gress before tolerance. Id. at 104.
202. Id. at 105.
203. Id. For a discussion of the historical harms which accompany this dehu-
manization, see John Hagan & Wenona Rymond-Richmond, The Collective Dy-
namics of Racial Dehumanization and Victimization in Darfur, 73 AM. SOC. REV.
867, 895 (2008) (detailing the state-sponsored social dehumanization in the Darfur
genocide).
204. Id. at 106.
205. Id. Marcuse notes these elites would be analogous to Plato’s philosopher
kings. Id.  Rather than embody the Gramscian “intellectual,” who articulate the
state ruling class’s interest, these Marcusian elites would work towards social pro-
gress. See Gramsci, supra note 164.
206. Marcuse, supra note 174, at 107–08.  Marcuse further notes the historical
basis to promote the views of the “oppressed” classes:  the development of democ-
racy from the English Civil War and the French Revolution, as well as the ending
of military and nationalist dictatorships in China and Cuba. Id. at 108.
207. Id. at 107.  While Marcuse does not note whether these elites would be
judges, such a role would perhaps be preferable to all branches of government
making these decisions. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 168, at 52–53 (noting the
Court has predominately done more harm than good regarding protecting vulnera-
ble minorities).  Such an approach would also democratize the decision-making
process beyond nine robed justices. Id.
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of the current system?208  The fundamental issue with allowing any
small cabal of individuals to decide what is and is not tolerable is
the ability to concentrate power in the hands of the few.209  While
Marcuse allows us to re-examine the foundations of tolerance, the
solution is not to create a new form of repressive tolerance but to
effect societal transformation with the oppressed social classes as-
serting their subjectivity.210
Marcuse and Draper represent two polarities of thought re-
garding tolerance’s role in social progress; Marcuse’s theory of tol-
erance is a means of social domination that requires an inversion;
we must become intolerant of intolerance and those ideas that op-
press.211  However, Draper conceives of tolerance as a means to
push society’s boundaries as to what is tolerable and what is not, in
the service of societal progress.212
While both viewpoints raise questions as to the best means of
affecting social change, ultimately both see tolerance as a dialectical
tool to affect progress.213  Their work enounces the difficulty in es-
tablishing legal values and tools to achieve social progress without
208. Hal Draper, An Analysis of Current Controversies Free Speech and Polit-
ical Struggle, INDEP. SOCIALIST, Apr. 1968, at 12, https://bit.ly/2EDv4BQ [https://
perma.cc/F52Y-KML4] (arguing against Marcuse’s philosophy as a means of pro-
moting further suppression of ideas); see also Samuel Farber, A Socialist Approach
to Free Speech, JACOBIN (Feb. 27, 2017), https://bit.ly/2FmGU3T [https://
perma.cc/8ZVR-XJLV] (arguing for freedom of speech for its own sake remains a
valuable norm).  This Comment was inspired and expands upon Farber’s criticisms
of Ash and Marcuse, while proposing alternative solutions beyond free speech ab-
solutism as a value. Id.
209. Draper questions the idea of the suppression of freedom of expression:
As long as we (the good guys) are not in power, we demand free speech
and other such liberties and we deserve them, because we are right.  But
wait till WE get power:  we are not going to be so foolish as to let YOU,
who are wrong, make trouble and corrupt the People.
Draper, supra note 208, at 13.
210. Id. at 16 (“And this movement both requires, and also helps to bring
about, the fullest opening-up of society to democratic controls from below—not
their further restriction.  It means the breaking up of anti-democratic limitations
and restrictions.  It means the greater unleashing of new initiatives from below.”).
211. Marcuse, supra note 174, at 115.
212. Draper, supra note 208, at 13 (“[I]t is never a matter of deciding whether
the right of free speech is ‘negated’ by some ‘higher value,’ . . . but simply a matter
of passing from one ground to a different ground . . . .”).  Essentially, Draper
inverts Marcuse:  rather than have free-speech, progress, and tolerance as hierar-
chies, these are all horizontal values which interact. Contra Marcuse, supra note
174, at 104.
213. Marcuse, supra note 174, at 114–15.  For a discussion of political re-
sponses, see Maximillian Alvarez, Antifascism and the Left’s Fear of Power, BAF-
FLER (May 16, 2018), https://bit.ly/2GyTY7Y [https://perma.cc/7MHQ-JY3J].
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sacrificing some values.214  If we wish to cease to be tolerant of in-
tolerance, we must be cautious to limit intolerance’s scope to find
“pure” tolerance as envisioned by Marcuse, while avoiding the po-
tential for abuse envisioned by Draper.215  Ultimately, any solution
must respect this tension, with the ghost of Mill serving as a Jacob
Marley.
D. Alternatives to Speech Suppression: Brandenburg 2.0,
Deliberative Democracy, and Tort Action
The Marcusian model reveals potential blind spots in our free-
speech justifications but does not necessarily provide an alternative
beyond a “progressive” intellectual class.216  However, understand-
ing what “tolerance” protects—not the vulnerable minority but the
status quo—allows us to craft solutions to this legal, philosophical,
and ultimately democratic problem.217  One alternative is to expand
the reach of the Brandenburg incitement test.218
The Brandenburg test asks whether advocacy incites the lis-
tener to imminent lawless action and whether such advocacy is
likely to produce such action.219  A stronger causal understanding
of the third factor, likelihood to occur, could allow for stronger reg-
ulation of hate speech.220
Treating hate speech like a proximate cause of harm could hold
speakers accountable for the actions of listeners.221  For example,
214. Draper, supra note 208, at 13 (noting the concern that turning over sup-
pression of racist speech is a double-edged sword to be used against progressive
causes).  Draper additionally has faith in the ability of democracy to overcome
injustice through dissent and in confronting fascism with speech and action. Id. at
14, 16.
215. Marcuse, supra note 174, at 109; see also BRAY, supra note 191, at 155–56
(detailing the discussion of “who decides” as a question of popular sovereignty
rather than one of elite decision-making).
216. Marcuse, supra note 174, at 109.
217. Id. at 94 (arguing that tolerance makes all viewpoints “true” and thus
prevents progress).  This protection of the status quo serves the interests of the
powerful. Id. at 95.
218. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
219. Id.
220. See Alexander, supra note 106, at 115–16 (discussing possible punish-
ment of speech where the speaker risks injury to persons through ordinary causal-
ity).  Alexander offers an example:  a speaker who, knowing the utterance of the
word “God” will cause a cathedral to collapse, says the word and the church col-
lapses. Id. at 114.  There is a causal connection and the speaker should be pun-
ished because of that causal connection. Id. at 115.  By tracing the casual
connection, Alexander’s standard expands the incitement standard to an intended
or expected result standard.
221. Id. at 116 (discussing how courts have constantly opposed this “unrea-
sonable risk” element).
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the law could criminalize the speech of someone who tells their
Twitter or radio followers to harass, harm, or kill others knowing
that their audience will act on such direction, especially in commu-
nities experiencing race-motivated violence.  While private racism,
or racism done through ignorance, would be unconscionable, it
would escape liability unless the speaker habitually preached the
desirability of harming a minority and thus established a causal
link.222
A second solution requires a balancing of “personal respect” of
the speaker with the “personal respect” of the groups affected by
the speech.223  While a speaker possesses the right to speak, there is
not a reciprocal right to unchallenged speech.224  Creating mecha-
nisms which create public forums wherein diverse speakers of all
ideological stripes engage with one another, moderated by a mutu-
ally selected third party to serve as a check to respectful or delegi-
timizing discourse would help solve the tension between a speaker’s
statements and their opponent’s desire to counter that speech on
the fly.225
This “respect” principle would require deliberative discourse
between interest groups at odds with one another to understand
one another and to do so in a mutually agreed upon method of
discourse.226  In a deliberative model, citizens face the empirical,
fact-based data and subjective realities from those who live with
racism, sexism, and oppression, while simultaneously allowing those
with “unpopular” opinions to speak.227  Communities, home listen-
ers, and students would be exposed, then and there, to the data,
realities, and humanity of each other, while allowing speakers to see
the “other,” encouraging robust civility and discourse.228  While
222. Id. at 114–16.
223. See Eser, supra note 199, at 135 (“[A] general statute, according to its
wording, may restrict the basic right, but the statute itself must be interpreted in
light of the significance of this basic right in a free and democratic state . . . .”).
224. BRAY, supra note 191, at 153.
225. Id. at 156.  Such a proposal could be analogous to the revival of the Fair-
ness Doctrine.  Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Contro-
versial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10416 (July 25, 1964).
226. JAMES FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK 122 (2009).  Fishkin offers
empirical support that deliberative democratic principles help resolve public
opinion.
227. Id. at 127 (providing empirical support for the claim that when people
deliberate regarding policy, biases shift).
228. See also ASH, supra note 151, at 230–31 (discussing methods of promot-
ing robust civility).  Such a proposal must be construed to acknowledge that white
people have never been a historically marginalized group and thus cannot lay
claim to this proposal as a method of enforcing moral equivalencies between
“Black Lives Matter” and “All Lives Matter.”  Ian Olasov, How Did “All Lives
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forcing the openness, or even the requirement of alternative view-
points, be they racist, liberal, conservative, or socialist, and thereby
“discriminating” against the individual speakers, such restrictions
would help curve “repressive” tolerance by pushing the legitimacy
of such views, similar to a political debate.229  In essence, citizens
would hear these ideas and understand their repercussions to the
community, and rather than allow and tolerate ideas which seek to
harm or exclude historically marginalized groups, a potential dia-
logue and change of ideas can occur when these adversaries are
given a forum and “forced” to engage with one another to deter-
mine policy decisions.230  While potentially requiring both more ad-
ministrative and bureaucratic policy-making procedures, such an
approach would move away from a “repressive” tolerance of ideas
towards active engagement with others in the marketplace of
ideas.231
A third and perhaps more workable solution would be the cre-
ation of a tort action.232  The State, if given criminal power to sup-
press, is a quick line to totalitarianism and the suppression of
dissidents, but a private remedy would provide an individualized
private remedy to social harm.233  Hate speech, like racist speech,
harms the individual and often threatens that individual with fur-
ther violence, through either normalizing dehumanization or actual
incitement, thereby dehumanizing masses of people.234  Rather
than require social debate as to whether hate speech is socially val-
Matter” Come to Oppose “Black Lives Matter”? A Philosopher of Language
Weighs In., SLATE (July 8, 2016), https://bit.ly/2EEaUsd [https://perma.cc/GMP6-
3ZDH].
229. BRAY, supra note 191, at 159 (questioning why the suppression of white
supremacy is somehow more deplorable than allowing it to flourish).
230. Id. at 160.
231. See id. at 163–64 for a discussion of anti-fascism and the university,
wherein the university is trapped in a quagmire of competing values:  free expres-
sion of ideas and protecting students.  A deliberative model would be adaptable to
universities where speakers are engaged with disparate viewpoints and cannot
merely handwave students, faculty, or outsiders from engaging with them. Id. at
150 (noting a viewpoint that one has a right to free speech, but also a right to be
told to shut up).
232. Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name Calling, in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT  89, 89 (1993) (detailing tort-
remedies for racial epithets).
233. BRAY, supra note 191, at 164 (detailing Milo Yiannopoulus’s efforts to
expose and harass transgender students).
234. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Vic-
tim’s Story, in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 17, 49 (1993) (discussing the victim’s re-
sponse to racial speech and violence).
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uable, as the debate between hate speech has been cast,235 a private
tort action would allow victims of hate speech to vindicate their au-
tonomy and heal their communities.236  While a tort action would
carry difficulties,237 the ability of society to force, not through vio-
lence or imprisonment but through litigation, a showing of the harm
that these words cause would allow for a non-criminal reaction to
hate speech.238  A tort could require the speech to:  (1) include a
statement of inferiority, for example of racial inferiority; (2) target
a politically and socially oppressed group; (3) persecute, exhibit
hate, or degrade; and (4) arise from the speaker’s intent to harm,
degrade, dehumanize, or intimidate the listener.239
Additionally, rather than damages, there could be a commu-
nity justice and deliberation component to share experiences and
break through the ideology which creates hate speech.240  Such ac-
tion would require extensive case-by-case analysis of the speech
and what type of speech should be universally condemned to bal-
ance the interests of both speakers and victims.241
Ultimately, the solutions presented above are not the sole
method of grappling with freedom of speech issues.  However, their
purpose is to show that the binary between speech restrictions and
free-speech absolutism conflates the potential democratic solutions
available when lawyers, philosophers, and policy-makers consider
what values and norms free speech should serve.
235. Id. at 31–32 (detailing the development of social libertarian thought,
which values freedom of expression).
236. Delgado, supra note 232, at 92–93 (detailing social harms of racial stig-
matization, as well as the harms that are inflicted on the perpetrator). But see
ASH, supra note 151, at 89 (arguing that while racist speech causes harm, the law
must respond to objective harm).  However, Ash ignores the difference between
offense, which merely is bothersome, and hate speech, which is “persecutory, hate-
ful and degrading.” See also Matsuda, supra note 234, at 36.
237. Delgado, supra note 232, at 104–06 (detailing the issues with calculating
damages).  Ultimately, such concerns could be resolved by compensating for sub-
sequent hateful actions. Id. at 106.
238. But see International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination art. 4, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (“States Parties condemn
all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of supe-
riority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin.”).  A tort
action could include other minority groups.
239. Matsuda, supra note 234, at 36.  This Comment adapts Matsuda’s para-
digm for recognizing hate speech.
240. Id. at 48 (discussing hearing the victim’s story in response to the hate
speech which affects them).
241. Id. at 38.
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IV. CONCLUSION
What can the Court’s history tell us about free speech?  While
the First Amendment enshrines free speech, those in power have
often contorted it to serve the preservation of power during histori-
cal times of crisis.242  While free speech embodies intellectualism,
liberty, and discourse, the values that First Amendment jurispru-
dence serves reveal that the Amendment does not always reflect
the free exchange of ideas, but one of serving power—at worst, en-
dorsing wholesale oppression, and at best, sanctioning hate speech
without accounting for the cost to minority groups.243  This philo-
sophical and legal conundrum has no easy answers and requires a
public reckoning with who free speech serves and what free speech
actually achieves.244  Ultimately, rather than blindly accepting free-
dom of speech as desirable, society should reexamine the use of
free speech today, and not rest on free-speech paradigms of John
Stuart Mill and Justice Holmes.
If the courts continue making ideologically blinded determina-
tions of when speech is or is not inciting, then ordinary people must
develop an alternative, otherwise the law merely protects the status
quo and presents no opportunity for the aggrieved to voice their
concerns.245  Without a rethinking of our First Amendment and the
values it serves, the Constitution becomes meaningless and the so-
lutions become extra-legal; the streets become a literal battlefield of
ideas.246  Ultimately, as a “political” and normative question, the
scope of the First Amendment will continue to resurface in Ameri-
can political life.  When it does, we must be willing to grapple with
whether the First Amendment serves human ends.
242. See PETER H. IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 291
(1999) (describing the Court’s reaction to the Red Scare in Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927) and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)).
243. Compare MILL, supra note 136, at 36–37, with Marcuse, supra note 174,
at 90–91.  Marcuse notes Mill’s examples of persecuted truths is validated by an ex
post viewing of history.  The conclusion of Marcusian philosophy is that we cannot
wait for history to determine whether we were correct or not, and thus society
must embody values prior to tolerance.  Marcuse, supra note 174, at 90–91.
244. See Marcuse, supra note 174, at 95 (noting that abstract tolerance is in-
validated by the current invalidation of the democratic process).
245. Id. at 116–17; see also supra Part II (discussing the voiding of community
responses to racism and fascism).
246. See BRAY, supra note 191, at 164–65 (detailing the far right, race-moti-
vated murder, and subsequent hate crimes at the University of Maryland).  The
University did not respond to racist flyers, and ultimately civil responses to hate
speech will evolve into a real battle. Id.
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